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1. Introduction 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, the median weekly earnings of male and 
female elementary and middle school teachers in 2006 were $920 and $824, respectively, 
whereas for male and female school principals and school district superintendents, median 
weekly earnings were $1275 and $1107, respectively.
 
 During the same year, the median 
weekly earnings of male and female registered nurses were $1074 and $971, respectively, 
whereas for male and female physicians and surgeons they were $1847 and $1329, 
respectively. Median weekly earnings of male and female cooks were $377 and $340, 
respectively, whereas for male and female restaurant waiters they were $284 and $348, 
respectively.
1 
What do the above examples have in common? First, each example involves a pair of 
job assignments within a firm that are distinctly complementary; Pilots and flight attendants 
are complementary labour inputs in the production of airline services, educational 
administrators and teachers are complements in the provision of educational services whilst 
physicians and nurses complement one another in the provision of health care services. 
Second, in each example for which data on earnings of each gender are available, there are 
noticeable gender pay gaps within job assignments – 9 per cent for school teachers, 20 per 
cent for principals and superintendents, nearly 10 per cent for registered nurses, 28 per cent 
for physicians and surgeons, nearly 30 per cent for lawyers, 10 per cent for cooks and 22.5 
per cent for waitpersons (in favour of females, however). A commonly asked question would 
be: How much of these intra-job gender pay gaps are attributable to discrimination? This is 
the approach taken in the traditional wage discrimination model, due originally to Becker 
(1971) and Arrow (1973). This model is based on the fundamental assumption that majority 
and minority workers are perfect substitutes in production. Consequently, the traditional 
                                                 
1 These numbers are taken from the Bureau of Labour Statistics website (http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf). 
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model is only appropriate for studying gender, racial, age, sexual orientation or other group 
pay differences for workers performing the same job assignment. 
In this paper, we address a different and more nuanced question: To what extent is 
majority/minority pay across complementary job assignments within a firm attributable to 
discrimination? For example, how much of the $931 (65.6%) pay gap between male aircraft 
pilots and flight engineers and female transportation attendants, the $1165 pay gap between 
male lawyers and female legal assistants and the $876 pay gap between male physicians and 
surgeons and female registered nurses, attributable to discrimination? Are these gaps 
primarily attributable to majority/minority productivity differences or to prejudice? This is a 
question about inter-job wage discrimination and it is a far more difficult question because to 
answer it we need to compare majority and minority workers for which there will be both 
distinct productivity and labour supply differences. In the traditional (intra-job assignment) 
model of wage discrimination, details of the production function are dispensed with because 
there are no productivity and labour supply differences between workers. In a study of 
discrimination across job assignments, however, the production and labour supply functions 
must be given explicit consideration.  
In what follows we empirically test the model of pay discrimination across job 
assignments developed by Bodvarsson and Sessions (2011) - hereafter BS - on an industry 
characterized by complementary job assignments, racial integration, variation in monopsony 
power across worker groups and a history of racial discrimination – U.S. Major League 
Baseball. 
We employ a novel, two-stage regression methodology in which a standardised 
measure (i.e. common) measure of productivity is estimated separately for each occupation. 
We then incorporate this measure as a right-hand-side explanatory variable in a second-stage, 
all-occupation regression designed to estimate cross-assignment discrimination. Our 
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empirical analysis finds convincing evidence of racial differences in pay across player job 
assignments, even after controlling for a wide array of demographic variables and position-
specific productivity. Moreover, we find strong evidence of BS’ theoretical prior that racial 
pay differentials across assignments are affected by changes in relative productivities. 
The paper is set out as follows: Section 2 discusses some of the previous literature on 
the economics of discrimination whilst Section 4 outlines our test case of Major League 
Baseball. Our empirical analysis is presented in Section 5 whilst final comments are collected 
in Section 6.  
2. Previous Literature 
While most of the literature on discrimination has focused on the measurement of the 
majority/minority pay gap within the same job category, some researchers have suggested 
that the required assumption of perfect substitution between inputs may be somewhat 
inappropriate. Indeed, Becker alluded to this issue by sketching a brief extension to his two-
factor black/white worker model to a three-factor model [see Becker (1971, pp. 59-62)]. Two 
of the factors are perfectly substitutable blacks and whites that belong to a group that could 
be termed ‘Type 1 Labour.’ Then, there is a third labour input, ‘Type 2 Labour,’ that both 
discriminates against blacks and is complementary to, or imperfectly substitutable, for them. 
Type 2 workers could, for example, be managers. In this situation, Becker showed that there 
would be a ceteris paribus black/white wage gap within the Type 1 category. Arrow (1973) 
elaborated on this by showing that the black/white wage gap depends upon the sensitivity of 
Type 2 labour’s reservation wage to the fraction of the firm’s labour force that is black, as 
well as the importance of Type 2 labour as an input (importance is measured as the size of the 
payments to Type 2 labour relative to Type 1 labour). Neither Becker nor Arrow tested these 
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propositions, nor did they investigate further the implications of complementarity in 
production for the black/white pay differential.  
 Welch (1967) raised the possibility that blacks and whites working in the same firm 
may not be perfect substitutes because there may be differences in their educational 
endowments. Welch suggested that, perhaps because of long-term discrimination, blacks may 
have acquired less schooling and/or attended lower quality schools. He modelled educational 
endowments and physical labour as separate factors of production, allowing for racial 
differences in educational endowments and, following Becker and Arrow, white co-worker 
discrimination. He argued that if firms choose racially integrated labour forces then blacks 
and whites must be complementary inputs. The intuition is that because of whites’ aversion 
to working with blacks, integration creates inefficiencies that will cause joint product to be 
less than the sum of individual black and white worker marginal products. The firm will 
therefore follow an apartheid employment policy unless there are sufficiently large 
complementarities to be exploited, i.e. if the gains from complementarity exceed the losses 
attributable to co-worker discrimination.
2
  
More recently, Kahn (1991) sets out a model of customer discrimination in which 
whites and blacks are represented as different inputs in the production function. He models 
blacks and whites as distinct inputs because if customers are prejudiced, they will act as if the 
amount of black input is equal to just a fraction of the input of otherwise identical white 
workers. Similarly, Bodvarsson and Partridge (2001) present a model of a professional sports 
team where white and non-white athletes are imperfect substitutes due to racial differences in 
prior training and experience.
3
  
                                                 
2 Borjas (2008) also suggested that differential educational attainments may render black and white workers as imperfect 
substitutes: ‘The two groups of workers might have different productivities because they might differ in the amount and 
quality of educational attainment, or because they might have been employed in different occupations and hence are entering 
(a) firm with different types of job training. [Borjas (2008), p. 128)].  
3 Both of these models, however, have features that limit their applicability. In Kahn’s model, whites and non-whites are 
assigned the same job and would be perfect substitutes if customers were unprejudiced whilst Bodvarsson and Partridge 
impose the restriction that the cross elasticity of demand for white labour with respect to non-white labour is negative. 
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 An extensive empirical literature on wage discrimination emerged during the 1970s, 
all based on the original Becker-Arrow model of perfect substitution. The accumulating 
evidence was called into question in the early 1980s, however, as a number of studies 
concluded that racial and ethnic groups were not perfectly substitutable. These studies 
typically applied econometric models of Translog or Generalized Leontief aggregate 
production functions to estimate elasticities of complementarity between groups. Grant and 
Hamermesh (1981), for example, found that black adults are imperfect substitutes for white 
men and complements to white women and youths; Borjas (1983) provided evidence which 
suggested that whilst black males were imperfect substitutes for white males, Hispanic males 
and white males were complementary; Borjas (1987) showed that black natives are imperfect 
substitutes for white natives; and Kahanec (2006) found that non-whites are complementary 
to whites.  
 The traditional empirical approach for testing wage discrimination is generally 
unsuitable where cross-assignment discrimination is concerned because it is based on a 
presumption that whites and non-whites are perfect substitutes. While empirical researchers 
have usually controlled for job assignment differences with dummy variables, that approach 
has severe limitations because it fails to adequately control for the structure of the underlying 
production function. As Hashimoto and Kochin (1980) argue, failure to account for any and 
all sources of productivity differences will generally exaggerate the estimated effects of 
discrimination.  
 In a recent theoretical contribution, BS extend the traditional Becker-Arrow model to 
ascertain how predictions regarding cross-assignment discrimination vary with the form of 
the production function. Using an approach similar to Kahn (1991), BS measure the extent of 
customer prejudice against non-white workers by a parameter, D.
4
 Customer prejudice may 
                                                 
4 Note that prejudice is a necessary but not sufficient condition for discrimination. It is only when prejudicial thoughts are 
acted upon through, for example, exercising product market demand that they can result in discriminatory outcomes in the 
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be interpreted as a situation in which customers discount the marginal revenue product 
(MRP) of non-white workers. The lower (higher) is D, the more (less) intense is the prejudice 
and the lower (higher) is non-white MRP. Prejudice dissipates as D approaches 1 and reaches 
a maximum as D falls to 0. While it is traditional to think of customer discrimination as 
implying a price discount on the output of non-white workers, the approach above is 
equivalent. The parameter D reflects the idea that non-white labour is valued less when 
customers are prejudiced.
5
 In terms of the Generalized Leontief function (GLF), for example, 
the impact of D is seen as follows: 
Q = g ij
j=1
k
å
i=1
k
å [Xi
W DX j
NW( )]
1
2  (1) 
where D ≤ 1, Q is output, WiX is the quantity of white labour input i, X j
NW is the quantity of 
non-white labour input j, and ijg is the technology coefficient. Note there are a total of 2k 
inputs – two groups of workers within each job assignment (white and non-white) x k job 
assignments.  
BO then apply Becker’s (1971) Market Discrimination Coefficient (MDC) to the case 
of discrimination across job groups. The MDC measures the ceteris paribus racial earnings 
gap viz. the percentage earnings premium paid to whites. If the white and non-white wage is 
denoted by r i , i = W, NW, then the MDC is given by: 
                                                                                                                                                       
labour market. In general, taste discrimination in pay and hiring is a market outcome that results from employers acting upon 
their own racial preferences and/or implementing the racial preferences of customers or co-workers.  
5 BS’ approach implies that consumers can discern the racial characteristics of workers when purchasing or consuming the 
particular good or service in question. Such an assumption is not unrealistic and examples abound of environments in which 
such an approach to discounting non-white MRP is likely to hold. At professional sports events, white (non-white) fans 
witness non-white (white) players’ contribution to athletic entertainment. If sports fans of one skin colour are prejudiced 
against players of another colour, this may result in lower pay to the latter group. A similar situation may arise in other 
entertainment services, e.g. films, theatre, popular music. More generally, there are many production situations in which 
consumers must interact with minority workers in order for a good or service to be dispensed, e.g. white patients interacting 
with non-white nurses or doctors, non-white clients interacting with white legal advisers, and white airline passengers 
interacting with non-white flight attendants. There will also be cases where prejudiced white consumers may not necessarily 
see non-white workers during the act of purchase or consumption, but mere knowledge of the racial composition of the work 
force may influence buying decisions. For example, white consumers may place a lower valuation on, or even refuse to 
purchase, food products, or appliance repair services, or the processing of important financial transactions, knowing that 
those goods or services were manufactured or performed by non-white workers.  
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MDCNW
W =
rW (D <1)
rNW (D <1)
-
rW (D <1)
rNW (D <1)
 (2) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (2) is the wage ratio when there is prejudice (i.e. 
when D <1) whereas the second term is the wage ratio in the absence of prejudice (i.e. when 
D = 1). The MDC is the difference between the two ratios and measures the ceteris paribus 
racial pay gap.  
Applying equation (2) to the case of cross-assignment discrimination, the ceteris 
paribus racial pay gap between whites performing job 1 and non-whites performing job 2 is: 
MDCNW2
W1 =
r1
W D <1( )
r2
NW D <1( )
-
r1
W D =1( )
r2
NW D =1( )
 (3) 
Similarly, the ceteris paribus racial pay gap between whites performing job 2 and non-whites 
performing job 1 is: 
MDCNW1
W2 =
r2
W D <1( )
r1
NW D <1( )
-
r2
W D =1( )
r1
NW D =1( )
 (4) 
BO derive the above measure of cross-assignment discrimination for four different 
production functions - Generalized Leontief, Quadratic, CES, and Cobb–Douglas. The 
Generalized Leontief provides the most general results, although closed form solutions are 
not possible. Closed form solutions, which are obtainable from the other three functions but 
only under restrictive assumptions, suggest that most predictions are generally robust across 
functional forms and that cross-assignment discrimination depends upon productivity and 
labour supply differences between the various worker groups, labour market structure, and 
the interaction between relative group productivity and prejudice. A uniform prediction 
across all four production functions is that changes in the relative productivity of one racial 
group induces changes in cross-assignment discrimination. For example, in all four cases, 
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higher white (non-white) productivity raises (lowers) the amount of discrimination.
6
 This is 
an important finding, both academically and in terms of policy. If non-whites are able to 
improve their skill-base, or if technological progress impacts more favorably on non-whites 
relative to whites, then cross-assignment discrimination may be reduced. An increase in 
white productivity, however, will lead to an unintended adverse consequence by increasing 
discrimination against non-whites.  
Table 1 following summarises BS’ various comparative static results for the ceteris 
paribus white/non-white pay differential (i.e. MDCNW2
W1 ) derived from the four production 
functions: 
Table 1: BS’ Comparative Static Results for Cross-Assignment Discrimination 
 
¶MDC
NW
2
W
1 ¶Variable( ) 
Variable Generalized 
Leontief 
Quadratic CES Cobb-
Douglas 
Strength of Prejudice (D) - - - - 
White Productivity + + + ± 
Non-White Productivity - - - ± 
White Productivity × D  - - -  
Non-White Productivity × D + + +  
White Labour Supply   -  
Non-White Labour Supply   +  
White Reservation Wage    + 
Non-White Reservation Wage    - 
Employer’s Monopsony Power    ± 
Degree Of Monopsonistic Wage Discrimination    - 
 
BS’ findings have an important general implication: Researchers must control for both 
productivity differences between white and non-white workers, as well as the interaction 
between race and productivity, when estimating the extent of cross-assignment 
discrimination. 
 
                                                 
6 Whilst BS frame their theoretical model in terms of racial discrimination, it is clearly applicable to other types of labour 
market discrimination, for example, where workers are discriminated against on account of their age, gender, nativity status, 
sexual orientation, religious affiliations, or other characteristics that may be targets of employer, employee, or consumer 
prejudice. 
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2. A Test Case: Major League Baseball 
In order to test empirically the BS model of cross-assignment discrimination, we searched for 
an appropriate test case viz. an industry where: (i) there are accurate data on salaries and 
productivity for individual workers across distinct job assignments and these data are 
available for different firms; (ii) the productivities of job assignment groups within the firm 
are interrelated; (iii) there is racial integration; (iv) the pay of some workers is competitively 
determined, whilst the pay of others is determined under conditions resembling monopsony; 
(v) there is potential for customer discrimination; and (vi) there have been changes in the 
number of employers in the industry over time. 
 One industry satisfying all these criteria is Major League Baseball (MLB) in the 
USA.
7
 In MLB, each team requires two distinctly complementary types of player skill - 
hitting (an offensive skill) and pitching (a defensive skill) - in the production of baseball 
entertainment.
8
 Player salaries are set under two different regimes, one competitive, the other 
monopsonistic. The monopsonistic regime applies to players with fewer than six years of 
MLB experience. These players are subject to the reserve clause and are constrained to 
negotiate their pay with only one team. The competitive regime applies to players with at 
least 6 years of MLB experience. They are eligible to file for free agency and may negotiate 
with any team in the league. Monopsony power effectively begins to erode, however, as early 
as the fourth year because then a player is eligible for final offer arbitration. Arbitration 
rights tend to relieve players of monopsonistic exploitation because arbitrators strive to award 
competitive salaries. Pitchers have historically been disproportionately white, whereas the 
pool of hitters has tended to be more racially balanced. The Major League added new teams 
                                                 
7 Racial discrimination in professional sports has received considerable attention among labour economists because of the 
abundant statistical evidence on a player’s personal attributes, compensation and productivity. Most studies in this area have 
focused on discrimination with respect to pay, hiring, retention and positional segregation. For an examination of the 
research prior to 2000, see Kahn’s (2000) expository survey.  
8 Woolway (1997) and Zech (1981) argue that the Cobb-Douglas function is a particularly appropriate description of an 
MLB team’s production situation. They both estimated Cobb-Douglas functions where the dependent variable is team 
winning percentage and the independent variables are player and team career statistics. 
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(called ‘expansion teams’) since the early 1990s, leading to a reduction in each team’s degree 
of monopsony power held over reserve clause players.  
 The ideal way to measure a Major League player’s marginal revenue product (MRP) 
is by his contribution to the team’s ticket, broadcasting and merchandise revenues. Because 
of the team production nature of baseball, however, it is difficult to empirically disentangle 
one player’s revenue contribution from another. We thus proxy MRP by the player’s years of 
MLB experience, tenure with his current team, and various career statistics (computed on a 
game-by-game basis since the beginning of the player’s Major League career) that proxy his 
ability and skills. For both hitters and pitchers we measure productivity using both individual 
and summary measures or performance. The individual career statistics we use to measure a 
hitter’s productivity are: At Bats, Stolen Bases, Bases on Balls (Walks), Hits, Sacrifice Flies, 
Hits by Pitches and Total Bases. We also include the summary measure of On Base plus 
Slugging (OPS). We distinguish between hitters that are ‘designated hitters’ from those who 
are not. A designated hitter is a player who is chosen at the start of the game to bat in lieu of 
the pitcher in the line-up. We also distinguish, using dummies, between hitters that serve 
other types of positions. These include whether the hitter served as an infielder or a catcher. 
We measure a pitcher’s productivity by use of the following individual career statistics: 
Complete Games, Shut Outs, Saves, Home Runs Conceded, Hits by Pitches, Walks, Strike 
Outs, Innings Pitched and Earned Runs. We also include the summary measure Defence-
Independent Component Earned Run Average (DICE). An explanation of baseball 
terminology is set out in the Appendix.  
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics for hitters and pitchers, respectively. Our full 
sample comprises 1092 hitters (548 white, 367 black and 177 Hispanic) and 1204 pitchers 
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(942 white, 127 black and 135 Hispanic). Salary, experience, performance and position data 
were drawn from the Lahman Baseball Database (see: www.baseball1.com) over four 
seasons - 1992, 1993, 1997 and 1998. We chose these years because the Major League 
expanded by two teams between 1992 and 1993 and again by two teams between 1997 and 
1998. This was thus a period in which MLB teams experienced a decline in their monopsony  
power and as a result might be expected to have been compelled to hire more black and 
Hispanic players.  
The salary data do not include information about contract length, bonus clauses or 
endorsements. Salaries for players on the Canadian teams were converted to U.S. dollars. The 
experience data were used to determine the player’s eligibility for free agency and final offer 
arbitration. For the U.S. teams, metropolitan area population and per-capita income were 
obtained from the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (see: www.bea.gov). For the 
Canadian teams, similar data were obtained from the Statistics Canada website (see: 
www.statcan.ca). Per-capita income data for the Canadian cities were converted to U.S. 
dollars. 
It would appear from Table 2 that there are no major differences between the personal 
and professional characteristics of white hitters, black hitters and Hispanic hitters, nor in the 
characteristics of the greater metropolitan area in which they play. In terms of career 
characteristics, however, black hitters record significantly more At Bats, Stolen Bases, Bases 
on Balls and Total Basses than either white hitters or Hispanic hitters. They are also less 
likely to play as an infielder or catcher, but more likely to play as an outfielder or designated 
hitter. Compared to Hispanic hitters, white hitters record significantly more At Bats, Bases on 
Balls and Total Bases, but significantly fewer Stolen Bases. They are also more likely to play 
as a catcher, but less likely to play as an outfielder or designated hitter.  
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Table 2: 
Descriptive Statistic - Hitters  
 All White Black Hispanic 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Personal Characteristics         
Log Annual Salary 13.890 1.13 13.865 1.10 13.938 1.13 13.866 1.22 
Age 30.304 3.70 30.596 3.49 30.488 3.95 29.023 3.55 
White 0.502 0.50 - - - - - - 
Black 0.336  0.48 - - - - - - 
Hispanic 0.162   0.37 - - - - - - 
Professional Characteristics         
MLB Experience 7.061 3.89 7.062 3.87 7.223 4.07 6.723 3.55 
MLB Experience-Squared 64.957 69.31 64.785 70.06 68.684 74.23 57.763 54.59 
Tenure with Current Club 2.672 3.00 3.062 3.38 2.305 2.62 2.226 2.24 
Free Agent 0.600 0.49 0.598 0.49 0.605 0.49 0.599 0.49 
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration 0.296 0.46 0.304 0.46 0.294 0.46 0.271 0.45 
American League 0.514 0.50 0.521 0.50 0.469 0.50 0.588 0.49 
National League 0.486 0.50 0.479 0.50 0.057 0.23 0.124 0.33 
Canadian Team 0.073 0.26 0.067 0.25 7.223 4.07 6.723 3.55 
Performance         
At Bats 2506.414 2001.58 2419.738 1940.51 2699.202 2198.95 2375.525 1720.23 
Stolen Bases 69.746 112.52 44.800 72.35 111.055 157.89 61.480 69.63 
Bases on Balls (Walks) 254.275 247.74 253.131 233.32 285.349 293.87 193.39 161.14 
Hits 693.882 589.16 658.164 559.63 749.278 639.78 689.605 562.82 
Sacrifice Flies 22.946 21.52 22.891 21.16 23.569 22.31 21.825 21.04 
Hits by Pitch 17.663 17.97 18.389 18.57 17.095 16.83 16.593 18.36 
Total Bases 1060.200 913.52 1016.772 880.39 1162.845 1013.19 982.073 771.85 
On Base Plus Slugging (OPS) 0.742 0.09 0.740 0.08 0.755 0.09 0.723 0.11 
Infielder 0.459 0.50 0.556 0.50 0.281 0.45 0.531 0.50 
Outfielder 0.383 0.49 0.217 0.41 0.657 0.48 0.333 0.47 
Catcher 0.116 0.32 0.189 0.39 0.016 0.13 0.096 0.30 
Designated Hitter 0.059 0.24 0.046 0.21 0.079 0.27 0.056 0.23 
Greater Metro Area Characteristics         
Percentage White 80.507 6.89 80.938 6.77 80.683 6.72 78.808 7.39 
Percentage Black 13.273 6.58 12.959 6.60 13.676 6.62 13.409 6.44 
Percentage Hispanic 10.621 10.65 10.719 10.80 10.331 10.58 10.918 10.36 
Average Annual Income ($) 25562.990 3789.65 25508.570 3757.99 25551.300 3731.59 25756.00 4016.17 
Population1 5514009 4657988 5313189 4509095 5513759 4729589 6137413 4927354 
Year Dummies         
1992 0.250 0.43 0.255 0.44 0.243 0.43 0.249 0.43 
1993 0.235 0.42 0.248 0.44 0.237 0.43 0.192 0.40 
1997 0.260 0.44 0.248 0.43 0.270 0.44 0.277 0.45 
1998 0.255 0.44 0.250 0.43 0.251 0.43 0.282 0.45 
Sample Size 1092 548 367 177 
Notes:  
1. Population denotes the greater metro area population; 
2. Source: All variables except Greater Metro Area Characteristics (GMAC) extracted from the Lahman Baseball Database (Version 5.0, Release 
Date: Dec. 15, 2002). GMAC derived from the Statistical Abstract 1997-1999, the BEA, CA1-3, and from Statistical Canada.. 
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Table 3:  
Descriptive Statistics - Pitchers 
 All White Black  Hispanic  
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Personal Characteristics         
Log Annual Salary 13.409 1.19 13.451 1.20 13.238 1.16 13.276 1.18 
Age 29.815 4.09 30.190 4.02 29.016 4.00 27.948 4.03 
White 0.782 0.41 - - - - - - 
Black 0.105 0.31 - - - - - - 
Hispanic 0.162 0.37 - - - - - - 
Professional Characteristics         
MLB Experience 5.988 4.20 6.158 4.20 5.772 4.49 5.000 3.75 
MLB Experience-Squared 53.468 76.64 55.562 78.38 53.331 75.31 38.985 63.34 
Tenure with Current Club 1.924 2.07 1.935 2.10 1.843 1.97 1.926 1.99 
Free Agent 0.467 0.50 0.482 0.50 0.441 0.50 0.385 0.49 
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration 0.306 0.46 0.314 0.46 0.236 0.43 0.319 0.47 
American League 0.513 0.50 0.518 0.50 0.543 0.50 0.452 0.50 
National League 0.487 0.50 0.475 0.50 0.528 0.50 0.556 0.50 
Canadian Team 0.069 0.25 0.063 0.24 0.055 0.23 0.126 0.33 
Performance         
Complete Games 10.15 22.24 10.981 23.33 6.433 14.87 7.844 19.65 
Shutouts 2.875 6.08 3.065 6.32 1.984 4.74 2.385 5.35 
Saves 19.488 51.87 20.941 52.93 19.362 62.60 9.474 26.16 
Home Runs Conceded 56.517 62.57 58.842 64.46 50.409 52.94 46.044 56.11 
Hits by Pitches         
Walks 225.779 249.73 231.782 257.66 224.095 217.58 185.474 217.41 
Strikeouts 436.641 514.13 450.726 530.21 436.047 490.18 338.919 402.35 
Innings Pitched 627.59 702.43 655.160 720.78 558.969 620.14 499.785 627.21 
Earned Run Average 4.025 0.96 3.995 0.94 4.175 1.11 4.094 0.97 
DICE 4.172 0.71 4.159 0.71 4.250 0.67 4.189 0.77 
Starter 0.442 0.50 0.441 0.50 0.402 0.49 0.489 0.50 
Greater Metro Area Characteristics         
Percentage White 80.714 6.84 80.695 6.91 80.335 6.56 81.201 6.59 
Percentage Black 13.038 6.46 12.946 6.49 14.026 6.46 12.750 6.19 
Percentage Hispanic 10.975 10.77 10.899 10.61 10.909 10.40 11.573 12.20 
Average Annual Income ($) 25488.2 3939.85 25491.51 3895.30 25852.23 3898.44 25122.19 4271.98 
Population1 5551948 4683875 5481401 4631793 6035905 4915887 5588930 4829139 
Year Dummies         
1992 0.221 0.42 0.236 0.42 0.189 0.39 0.148 0.36 
1993 0.239 0.43 0.248 0.43 0.244 0.43 0.170 0.38 
1997 0.264 0.44 0.256 0.44 0.276 0.45 0.311 0.46 
1998 0.276 0.45 0.260 0.44 0.291 0.46 0.370 0.48 
Sample Size 1204 942 127 135 
Notes:  
1. Population denotes the greater metro area population; 
2. Source: All variables except Greater Metro Area Characteristics (GMAC) extracted from the Lahman Baseball Database (Version 5.0, Release 
Date: Dec. 15, 2002). GMAC derived from the Statistical Abstract 1997-1999, the BEA, CA1-3, and from Statistical Canada 
3. DICE = Defence-Independent Component Earned Run Average  
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In Table 3, the domination of white pitchers is immediately apparent. White pitchers 
are on average older than both black and (especially) Hispanic pitchers. They also enjoy 
higher average earnings. In terms of career characteristics, white pitchers record significantly 
higher Wins, Losses, Games Started, Complete Games, Shutouts, Saves, Homeruns, Walks, 
Strikeouts and Innings Pitched than either blacks or Hispanic pitchers, with Hispanic pitchers 
recording generally lower figures than black pitchers.  
3.2 Empirical Methodology 
Wage discrimination occurs when individuals who are identical in terms of their productive 
characteristics are paid differently on account of their non-productive characteristics. Any 
empirical analysis of discrimination thus requires some control of productivity - it would not 
be surprising, and nor would it suggest discrimination, if more productive individuals were 
paid more than less productive individuals. In the traditional literature such control is usually 
straightforward since the individuals under scrutiny are performing the same job. In our 
model, however, it is problematic. Our concern is whether there is discrimination across job 
assignments, that is, where individuals with different non-productive characteristics are 
performing different jobs - do male airline pilots earn more than female flight attendants 
because of their occupation or because of their gender? This is a difficult issue to address 
empirically because we need to control for the productivity of both the pilot and the flight 
attendant or, more generally, we need to control for assignment-specific productivity. Clearly 
some measures of productivity will be common across job assignments - for example, 
education, job-tenure, and labour market experience. By definition, however, some measures 
of productivity will be unique to particular job assignments and it is controlling for these that 
is the real challenge. 
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One possible solution is to adopt a two-stage generated regressor approach.
9
 Assume 
that wages reflect productivity as follows: To ascertain the level of discrimination across 
player positions, we need to control for position-specific productivity. In one sense this is 
straightforward because some measures of off-field productivity (MLB experience and tenure 
with current team, for example) are common across pitchers and hitters. On-field measures of 
productivity, however, vary across hitters and pitchers; e.g. runs for hitters and strike-outs for 
pitchers. Given our objective of ascertaining the extent of racial discrimination across job 
assignments, we need a standardized productivity measure. We thus adopt the following two-
stage approach. We first assume that wages reflect productivity as follows: 
0 0 1 1
ln
ij j ij ij
w       (5) 
 ln w
ij
 
denotes the log wage of a member of group i =1,2,..., I  employed in job assignment 
j =1,2,..., J , 
0
j
  is a vector of ‘assignment-specific’ productivity measures, 
1
  is a vector 
of ‘common’ (i.e. cross assignment) productivity measures (e.g. education, tenure), and the 
B’s denote parameter vectors. Our aim is to derive an estimating equation of the form: 
0 0 1 1
ln
ij ij ij
w       (6) 
where 
0
  denotes some standardised (imputed) measure of assignment-specific productivity. 
To this end, we estimate the following ‘first-stage’ group-assignment regressions:  
 (7) 
That is, we estimate separate wage regressions for individual within each job assignment, 
including as explanatory variables only the various assignment-specific productivity 
                                                 
9 See Pagan (1984), Gauger (1989) and Gawande (1996) for discussions of the inference issues regarding estimated 
regressor models.  
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measures. Thus, we estimate separate wage regressions for hitters and pitchers on only their 
respective position-specific variables in both individual (I) and summary (S) form: 
Hitters:  (I) At Bats; Stolen Bases; Bases on Balls (Walks); Hits, Sacrifice Flies, Hits by Pitches, Total 
Basses, Infielder; Outfielder; Catcher; Designated Hitter.  
(S) On Base plus Slugging (OBS); Infielder; Outfielder; Catcher; Designated Hitter. 
Pitchers: (I) Complete Games; Shut Outs; Saves; Home Runs Conceded; Hit by Pitches; Walks, Strike 
Outs; Innings Pitched; Earned Runs; Starter. 
(S) Defence-Independent Component Earned Run Average (DICE); Starter. 
We then use the predicted values from these regressions, wˆ = wˆij;"i, j( ) , as a standardized 
measure of assignment-specific productivity in second-stage regressions of the form: 
0 1 1
ˆln
ij ij ij
w w     (8) 
3.3 Cross-Assignment Regression Analysis 
Our estimates of equation (7) - the first stage regression - for hitters and pitchers respectively 
are set out in Tables 4 and 5 following: 
 
Table 4: 
First-Stage Regression – Hitters 
 Individual Measures 
(1) 
Summary Measures  
(2) 
Variable Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
At Bats -0.000*** 0.000 - - 
Stolen Bases 0.000*** 0.000 - - 
Walks 0.000*** 0.000 - - 
Hits -0.000*** 0.000 - - 
Sacrifice Flies 0.003*** 0.004 - - 
Hit By Pitches 0.007*** 0.002 - - 
Total Bases 0.001*** 0.000 - - 
Infielder 0.142*** 0.238 0.041*** 0.269 
Outfielder 0.087*** 0.235 -0.178*** 0.266 
Catcher 0.265*** 0.250 0.116*** 0.282 
Designated Hitter -0.265*** 0.199 0.179*** 0.223 
On Base Plus Slugging (OPS) - - 6.377*** 0.352 
Constant 12.915*** 0.239 9.183*** 0.379 
R-Squared 0.427 0.246 
Number of Observations 1092 1092 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: 
First-Stage Regression - Pitchers 
 (1) 
Individual Measures 
(2) 
Summary Measures 
 Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
Complete Games -0.063*** 0.009 - - 
Shut Outs 0.113*** 0.033 - - 
Saves 0.002*** 0.001 - - 
Home Runs Conceded -0.008*** 0.003 - - 
Hit By Pitches 0.001*** 0.001 - - 
Walks 0.000*** 0.001 - - 
Strike Outs 0.003*** 0.001 - - 
Innings Pitched -0.001*** 0.001 - - 
Earned Runs 0.000*** 0.001 - - 
     
Starter 0.300*** 0.08 2.359*** 0.369 
     
Starter × Complete Games 0.025*** 0.010   
Starter × Shut Outs -0.054*** 0.034   
Starter × Saves -0.001*** 0.003   
Starter × Home Runs Conceded 0.008*** 0.004   
Starter × Hit By Pitches 0.003*** 0.001   
Starter × Walks -0.000*** 0.001   
Starter × Strike Outs -0.001*** 0.001   
Starter × Innings Pitched -0.002*** 0.002   
Starter × Earned Runs -0.002*** 0.001   
     
DICE
1 
- - -0.561*** 0.051 
Starter × DICE
1
 - - -0.387*** 0.087 
     
Constant 12.348*** 0.051 15.423*** 0.215 
R-Squared  0.547  0.272 
Number of Observations  1204  1204 
Notes: 1. DICE ~ Defence-Independent Component ERA; 2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
In the first specification of Table 4, the individual hitter performance measures are used as 
regressors. A player’s total number of bases has a significant positive effect on his salary. 
Controlling for this, players who obtain a lot of their bases through singles (i.e. have a lot of 
hits or at bats) have lower salaries, however this effect is not significant. Being hit by a pitch 
is also a significant determinant of salary. In the second specification of the table, the 
individual measures are replaced with OPS, which is found to have a highly significant 
positive effect on salary. 
In the first specification of Table 5, pitchers’ individual performance measures are 
included in the salary regression. Strike outs have a highly significant positive effect on 
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salary. Shutouts, saves and conceding few home runs are also important. Having a lot of 
complete games is seen to lower relief pitchers’ salaries, but have no effect on starters’ 
salaries. Holding everything else equal, starters are seen to earn more than relief pitchers. 
When DICE is used in place of the individual performance measures in specification 2, it is 
found to have a significant negative effect on salary, as predicted, and this is found to be 
stronger for starters than for relief pitchers. 
Table 6 provides an analysis of how salary and productivity (as estimated in Tables 4 
and Table 5) varies across position and race/ethnicity groups: 
 
Table 6: 
Mean Salary and Productivity for Race / Position Groups 
 Whites Blacks Hispanics 
Log Salary    
Pitchers 13.451***** 13.238*††††† 13.276††† 
Hitters 13.865***** 13.938†††††† 13.866††† 
Log Salary minus Productivity    
Pitchers 0.021***** -0.205***††† 0.046††† 
Hitters -0.024*****† 0.007††††† 0.059††† 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significant difference from whites in the same position at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. †, 
†† and ††† denote significant difference from whites in the opposite position at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
In the first panel of Table 6 we compare the mean (log) salary across race / position groups. 
In all cases hitters earn more than pitchers but the gap is particularly large for blacks and 
Hispanics. Black pitchers earn significantly less than white pitchers, black and Hispanic 
pitchers earn significantly less than white hitters whilst black and Hispanic hitters earn 
significantly more than white pitchers. The key question is whether these cross-assignment 
gaps are due to systematic differences across races in pitching and hitting ability or whether 
they reflect discrimination with equally productive players being remunerated differently 
depending upon race. In the second panel of Table 6 we compare mean (log) salary less 
estimated productivity across race / position groups. It is apparent that most of the cross-
assignment differences are now insignificant, suggesting that the differences in salary may be 
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largely explained by differences in performance. However, black pitchers appear to be 
underpaid relative to their productivity compared to both white pitchers and white hitters. 
 The values in the second panel implicitly assume that whites, blacks and Hispanics 
are all rewarded at the same rate for given increases in productivity. The theory of BS, 
however, suggests that this may not be case. In addition, the values do not control for 
components of productivity that affect both pitchers and hitters. Therefore, we set out our 
estimate of equation (8) (i.e. the second stage regression) in Table 7 and Table 8 following.  
 In Table 7 we report four second-stage specifications with log salary being regressed 
on imputed productivity from Table 4 and Table 5, dummy variables for race and position, 
interactions between productivity, race and position, and a set of controls for professional 
characteristic that affect the salaries of both pitchers and hitter. Whites are the reference 
category in all specifications. In specifications (1)-(3), imputed productivity is derived from 
individual productivity measures [i.e. specification (1) in Table 4 and Table 5] whilst 
specification (4) is derived from the relevant summary measure employed in specification (2) 
of Table 4 (i.e. OPS) and Table 5 (i.e. DICE).
10
 
 Despite the tendency to focus on ‘hitters versus pitchers’ baseball remains a team 
sport and we allow for possible complementarities in production by introducing team fixed 
effects in specifications (2)-(4) of Table 7 to control for both differences in teams’ abilities to 
pay and team spill-overs.
11
 We also control for the possibility that discrimination reflects a 
team’s willingness to only select players of races that are common in the local area by 
including in specification (3) the percentages of each race category living in the greater 
metropolitan area in which the team is located. 
                                                 
10
 Using OPS in the first stage imposes the implicit constraint that slugging average and on-base percentage 
have the same effect on earnings, which is unlikely to be realistic. However, when slugging average and on-base 
percentage were used in place of OPS, the second stage results were almost identical. 
11
 For example, Gould and Winter (2010) show that a worker’s effort has a positive effect on the effort of 
coworkers if they are complements in production and a negative effect if they are substitutes. In terms of MLB 
specifically, they find that a hitter’s productivity is positively related to the productivity of the other hitters on 
his team but negatively related to his team’s pitching quality.  
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 The results in Table 7 suggest strong evidence of both cross- and within-assignment 
discrimination in MLB. Our estimated coefficients are robust across the four specifications 
and suggest that, at the mean of productivity, white hitters earn 0.14% more than black 
pitchers; 2.13% less than Hispanic pitchers; 0.69% less than black hitters; 0.14% less than 
Hispanic hitters; and 1.55% less than white pitchers. 
 The coefficients on the triple interactions (i.e. position × race × productivity) capture 
how much a given increase in productivity is rewarded in the labour market within a specific 
position-race group relative to its effect on white hitters. It would appear that up to a certain 
level of productivity, our results support BS’ predictions. Consider, for example, black 
pitchers versus white hitters: We know from Table 6 that black pitchers are underpaid 
relative to white hitters. In Table 7, we see a positive and significant positive coefficient on 
black*pitcher and a negative and significant coefficient on black*pitcher*productivity. This 
suggests that at low productivity levels, black pitchers are overpaid compared to whites and 
that, in this region, an increase in black pitcher productivity will decrease the MDC. Beyond 
a certain performance level, however, the earnings of black pitchers fall below those of white 
hitters. In this region, blacks pitchers are relatively underpaid, and raising their productivity 
will increase the MDC. Comparing Hispanic pitchers to white hitters, we find the opposite 
relationship with Hispanic pitcher being relatively underpaid (overpaid) at low (high) levels 
of productivity. The two cases are illustrated graphically in Figure 1 with black and Hispanic 
pitcher pay equalling that of white hitters at productivity levels of 13.57 and 12.12 
respectively: 
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Figure 1: Cross Assignement Wage Discrimination and Productivity 
Four additional regressions are set out in Table 8. Specification (1) groups U.S.-born 
Hispanics with whites (using Hispanic classification based on players’ facial appearances). 
Specification (2) uses players’ performance measures from the previous season, rather than 
career performance to date, in the first-stage regressions since it might be expected that these 
have a greater effect on salary than performance several seasons before. Finally, to explore 
how discrimination varies with the degree of monopsony power, specifications (3) and (4) 
split the sample into free agents and non-free agents respectively.  
It would appear from Table 8 that our results are robust to treating U.S. born 
Hispanics as whites and to estimating productivity on the previous season’s performance 
rather than on career performance to date. Finally, we find evidence that discrimination is 
higher amongst non-free agents, a result that would appear to contradict BS’ prior that 
discrimination may decline with the degree of monopsony power in the market. 
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Table 7: Second-Stage Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Log Annual Salary  
        (1)         (2)         (3)         (4) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
(Imputed) Productivity         
Individual Measures 0.842*** 0.148 0.845*** 0.146 0.848*** 0.144 - - 
Summary Measure - - - - - - 0.606*** 0.032 
Interactions         
Pitcher 0.181*** 0.911 0.274*** 0.852 0.309*** 0.828 -0.866*** 0.434 
Pitcher × Black 2.723*** 0.220 2.438*** 0.309 2.519*** 0.324 2.842*** 0.186 
Pitcher × Hispanic -2.157*** 0.181 -2.143*** 0.070 -2.156*** 0.065 0.655*** 0.354 
Pitcher × Productivity -0.000*** 0.065 -0.007*** 0.060 -0.010*** 0.058 0.080*** 0.031 
Pitcher × Black × Productivity -0.214*** 0.017 -0.192*** 0.023 -0.198*** 0.024 -0.217*** 0.014 
Pitcher × Hispanic × Productivity 0.163*** 0.013 0.162*** 0.005 0.163*** 0.006 -0.053*** 0.025 
Hitter × Black -0.348*** 0.412 -0.308*** 0.352 -0.244*** 0.354 -1.347*** 0.104 
Hitter × Hispanic -4.061*** 1.127 -4.154*** 1.063 -4.165*** 1.002 -1.749*** 0.344 
Hitter × Black × Productivity 0.031*** 0.031 0.028*** 0.027 0.023*** 0.027 0.105*** 0.008 
Hitter × Hispanic × Productivity 0.299*** 0.083 0.305*** 0.078 0.306*** 0.074 0.135*** 0.025 
Professional Characteristics         
Age -0.034*** 0.013 -0.030*** 0.014 -0.029*** 0.015 -0.033*** 0.015 
Experience 0.152*** 0.051 0.140*** 0.051 0.137*** 0.052 0.304*** 0.043 
Experience Squared -0.010*** 0.003 -0.009*** 0.003 -0.009*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.002 
Tenure 0.068*** 0.021 0.069*** 0.019 0.068*** 0.019 0.078*** 0.011 
Free Agent 0.947*** 0.132 0.970*** 0.132 0.980*** 0.134 0.746*** 0.110 
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration  0.523*** 0.071 0.534*** 0.067 0.537*** 0.071 0.391*** 0.058 
American League -0.040*** 0.034 -0.077*** 0.071 0.040*** 0.060 -0.128*** 0.026 
Canadian Team -0.100*** 0.092 - - - - - - 
Year Dummies         
1993 0.068*** 0.020 0.064*** 0.014 0.082*** 0.021 0.073*** 0.026 
1997 0.114*** 0.082 0.034*** 0.076 -0.043*** 0.039 0.099*** 0.112 
1998 0.208*** 0.081 0.108*** 0.060 0.072*** 0.025 0.190*** 0.118 
Greater Metro Area Characteristics          
Percentage White - - - - 0.041*** 0.023 - - 
Percentage Black - - - - 0.218*** 0.035 - - 
Percentage Hispanic - - - - 0.083*** 0.021 - - 
Average Annual Income 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
Metropolitan Area Population 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
Constant 1.543*** 1.883 1.246*** 2.278 -4.602*** 3.299 3.621*** 0.986 
Team Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.692 0.700 0.702 0.673 
Number of Observations 2296 2296 2296 2296 
Notes: 1. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively;  
           2. White Hitter is the reference category. 
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Table 8: Additional Second-Stage Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Log Annual Salary  
Variable (1) 
US Born Hispanics = Whites 
(2) 
Previous Season 
(3) 
Free Agents 
(4) 
Non-Free Agents 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
(Imputed) Productivity         
Individual Measures 0.798*** 0.138 0.816*** 0.034 0.771*** 0.128 2.420*** 0.068 
Pitcher 0.535*** 0.853 0.778*** 0.343 0.355*** 1.079 16.019*** 0.391 
Pitcher × Black 2.128*** 0.326 0.987*** 0.098 1.003*** 0.412 5.692*** 0.186 
Pitcher × Hispanic -2.674*** 0.507 -0.332*** 0.163 -5.022*** 0.735 1.639*** 0.512 
Pitcher × Productivity -0.026*** 0.060 -0.050*** 0.025 -0.014*** 0.076 -1.171*** 0.029 
Pitcher × Black × Productivity -0.161*** 0.025 -0.078*** 0.007 -0.094*** 0.029 -0.440*** 0.014 
Pitcher × Hispanic × Productivity 0.196*** 0.036 0.027*** 0.012 0.356*** 0.050 -0.120*** 0.040 
Hitter × Black -0.385*** 0.261 0.221*** 0.072 0.264*** 0.433 -0.347*** 0.742 
Hitter × Hispanic -3.906*** 1.304 -2.049*** 0.487 -3.439*** 1.327 -3.049*** 0.767 
Hitter × Hispanic × Productivity 0.284*** 0.095 0.152*** 0.035 0.248*** 0.095 0.234*** 0.057 
Hitter × Black × Productivity 0.034*** 0.020 -0.013*** 0.006 -0.012*** 0.032 0.038*** 0.055 
R-Squared 0.683 0.787 0.479 0.744 
Number of Observations 2083 2296 1217 1079 
Notes: 1. All specifications include the regressors from specification (3) of Table 7;  
                2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; 
                3. White Hitter is the reference category; 
                4. Specification (1) groups US-born Hispanics with whites, using Hispanic classification based on players’ facial appearances. Specification (2) incorporates 
(individual) performance measures from the previous season in the first-stage regressions. Specifications (3)-(4) split the sample into free agents and non-free 
agents respectively. 
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3.4. Decomposition Analysis 
In this section, we attempt to identify cross-assignment discrimination using another empirical 
approach. The fact that players of a particular race in a particular position enjoy a wage 
differential over players of another race in another position could be a reflection of the former 
group’s greater endowment of ‘earning characteristics’. White pitchers may, for example, be 
more productive or have more experience on average than non-white (i.e. black or Hispanic) 
hitters. Alternatively, white pitchers may be better rewarded for the characteristics they do 
possess, suggesting some form of positive (negative) discrimination from employers towards 
white pitchers (non-white hitters). To address this issue we perform a Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition to separate the earnings differential into an ‘endowment component’, to account 
for differences in endowments between individuals, and a ‘price component’, which is usually 
associated with discrimination.
12
  
Recalling equation (7), we write the earnings function of players of race j in position i as: 
 (9) 
where i = W , NW( ) and j = H ,P( )  denote white and non-white and pitchers and hitters 
respectively, and where NW = B, H( ) denotes black and Hispanic respectively.  
denotes our vectors of position-specific and common productivity characteristics,  
the corresponding coefficient vectors to be estimated, and  e
ij
 some well-behaved error term. 
Thus, the earnings functions of white pitchers, non-white pitchers, white hitters and non-white 
hitters may be denoted: 
                                                 
12 This method of decomposition, initially proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), and later generalized by Oaxaca and 
Ransom (1994), has been applied extensively to discrimination on the basis of gender, race, caste and religion. 
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 (10) 
 (11) 
 (12) 
 (13) 
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition divides wage differentials into a part that is ‘explained’ by 
group differences in productivity and a residual part that cannot be accounted for by such 
differences in wage determinants. This latter ‘unexplained’ component is often used as a measure 
for discrimination. For example, the predicted average white pitcher/non-white hitter (WP-
NWH) differential may be represented as: 
 (14) 
The first term, , represents differences in endowments between members of 
the two groups whilst the second term, , represents differences in coefficients 
and thus, by extension, rewards. Note that if the overall differential is negative (i.e. 
) but the second term is positive [i.e. ], then it would 
suggest that non-white hitters are discriminated against despite earning, on average, more than 
white hitters - i.e. non-white hitters would do even better with the earnings generating function 
of white pitchers than with their own.  
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 Table 9 reports the above decomposition analysis on the salary gaps between each cross-
assignment pair. Focussing on the mean decomposition results first, it is apparent from the first 
and second panels of Table 8 that our regression model implies a positive salary premium for 
black and Hispanic hitters over white pitchers ceteris paribus. The decomposition suggests that 
this premium would be even greater in the absence of discrimination, with discrimination against 
black and Hispanic hitters alleviating the potential differential by almost 50 per cent and 100 per 
cent respectively.  
 The third and fourth panels focus on the white hitter / black pitcher and white hitter / 
Hispanic pitcher decomposition. Both decompositions imply a positive mean salary premium at 
for white hitters with discrimination playing a relative minor role in the white hitter / black 
pitcher differential, discrimination against white hitters reducing the potential white hitter 
premium by just under 5 per cent. It would appear that discrimination plays a much more 
significant role in the white hitter / Hispanic pitcher differential with discrimination against 
white hitters reducing the potential differential by just over 60 per cent. 
 The results set out in Table 9 suggest that the coefficients effect generally works to 
reduce the minority group’s salary, even where that group has higher average pay. However, the 
quantile decomposition suggests that that at the bottom of the salary distribution over 100% of 
cross-assignment differences between race groups is explained by differences in observable 
productivity, with differences in rewards working to reduce the gap. At the top end of the salary 
distribution, the coefficients effect is mostly insignificant, a finding that is consistent with a 
situation in which salaries are compressed at the bottom end of the distribution [Papps (2013)]. 
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Table 9 
Decomposition Analysis 
Race / Position Group Pair Mean 10
th
 Percentile 50
th
 Percentile 90
th
 Percentile 
 Coefficient       % Coefficient       % Coefficient       % Coefficient       % 
 
White Pitcher – Black Hitter 
        
Endowment Effect -0.727*** 149.28 -0.618*** 143.39 -0.581*** 104.87 -0.334*** 112.08 
Coefficients Effect 0.240*** -49.28 0.187*** -43.39 0.027*** -4.87 0.036*** -12.08 
Total Effect -0.487*** 100.00 -0.431*** 100.00 -0.554*** 100.00 -0.298*** 100.00 
 
White Pitcher – Hispanic Hitter 
        
Endowment Effect -0.828*** 199.52 -0.569*** 241.10 -0.543*** 93.78 -0.194*** 64.03 
Coefficients Effect 0.413*** -99.52 0.333*** -141.10 -0.036*** 6.22 -0.109*** 35.97 
Total Effect -0.415*** 100.00 -0.236*** 100.00 -0.579*** 100.00 -0.303*** 100.00 
 
White Hitter – Black Pitcher 
        
Endowment Effect 0.599*** 95.53 1.122*** 218.71 0.946*** 111.82 -0.086*** -21.13 
Coefficients Effect 0.028*** 4.47 -0.609*** -118.71 -0.100*** 118.20 0.493*** 121.13 
Total Effect 0.627*** 100.00 0.513*** 100.00 0.846*** 100.00 0.407*** 100.00 
 
White Hitter – Hispanic Pitcher 
        
Endowment Effect 0.947*** 160.78 0.949*** 212.30 1.058*** 122.60 0.437*** 191.67 
Coefficients Effect -0.358*** -60.78 -0.502*** -112.30 -0.195*** -22.60 -0.209*** 91/67 
Total Effect 0.589*** 100.00 0.447*** 100.00 0.863*** 100.00 0.228*** 100.00 
Notes: 1. The mean results refer to Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions of the differences in log salary between the two groups and use the coefficients 
of the second group in each case; 2. The percentile results refer to decompositions of the differences between the quantile function of log salary for 
the two groups, as described in Chernozhukov et al. (2009); In all cases, the regressors include age, estimated productivity, experience, experience 
squared, tenure, free agent, salary arbitration eligibility, American League, Canadian team, average annual income, metropolitan area population, 
year dummies and a constant; 3. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Our decomposition results are also consistent with our regression results from the previous 
section. That is, for the white hitter / black pitcher decomposition, whilst the coefficients effect 
explains part of the overall wage gap (cf. the first column of Table 9 with the second panel of 
Table 6), at the 10th (90
th
) percentile the coefficients effect reduces (widens) inequality, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. As regards the white hitter / Hispanic pitcher decomposition, the 
coefficients effect implies that Hispanic hitters earn more than they should, given their 
productivity, at both the 10th and 90
th
 percentiles, a finding that is also consistent with Figure 1 
assuming that Hispanic hitters are always in the upper region. 
6. Final Comments 
In this study we address a widely neglected problem in the literature on taste discrimination in 
pay: ascertaining the extent to which racial or gender differences in pay across job assignments 
are attributable to prejudice. Virtually every wage discrimination study has focused on 
discrimination within the same job assignment, thus treating whites and non-whites (or males 
and females) as perfect substitutes. In a recent contribution, BS investigate the case of 
discrimination across job assignments, where assignments are viewed as distinct inputs. BS’ 
theoretical findings underscore the importance of carefully considering the production function 
when there are productivity differences between majority and minority workers. An important 
finding from their theoretical analysis is that the magnitude of, for example, differences in white 
relative to non-white productivity influences the amount of discrimination. Furthermore, when 
whites and non-whites are interrelated in production, race and productivity will interact. This is 
an important implication, for it means that whenever white and non-white workers have 
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productivity differences, the researcher should include productivity x race interactions in any 
empirical specification. 
We test BS’ model using data from Major League Baseball, an industry characterized by 
complementary job assignments, a history of racial integration and discrimination, and a dual 
labour market structure. We find convincing evidence of racial differences in pay across player 
job assignments, even after controlling for a wide array of demographic variables and position-
specific productivity. Moreover, we find strong evidence of BS’ theoretical prior that racial pay 
differentials across assignments are affected by changes in relative productivities. 
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Appendix:  Baseball Terminology 
General 
1. An infielder is a defensive player who plays on the infield, the dirt portion of a baseball diamond between first 
and third bases. The specific infielder positions are first baseman, second baseman, shortstop (which is between 
second and third bases) and third baseman. In contrast, an outfielder plays farthest from the batter and his 
primary role is to catch long fly balls. Outfielder positions include left fielder, centre fielder and right fielder. 
The catcher crouches behind home plate and receives the ball from the pitcher. Because the catcher can see the 
whole field, he is best positioned to lead and direct his fellow players in play. He typically calls the pitches by 
means of hand signals, hence requires awareness of both the pitcher’s mechanics and the strengths and 
weaknesses of the batter. A designated hitter is a player permitted to bat in place of the pitcher in the American 
League. 
Hitters 
2. A player has an at bat every time he comes to bat, except in certain circumstances, e.g. if he is awarded first 
base due to interference or obstruction or the inning ends while he is still at bat.  
3. A hitter is assigned a stolen base (also called a steal) when he reaches an extra base on a hit from another 
player. For example, suppose that hitter A is at first base when hitter B hits the ball. Hitter B reaches first base 
(he would be assigned a single), but hitter A reaches third base. Hitter A would be assigned a stolen base 
because he reached an extra base.  
4. A base on balls (also called a walk) is assigned when the batter receives four pitches each of which the umpire 
determines is a ball. A ball is any pitch at which the batter does not swing and is out of the strike zone (which 
means it would not qualify to be a strike). When the hitter is assigned a base on balls, he is entitled to walk to 
first base.  
5. A batter scores a hit when he safely reaches first base after hitting the ball into fair territory, without the benefit 
of an error or a fielder’s choice.  
6. A sacrifice fly is a batted ball that satisfies four criteria: (i) there are fewer than two outs when the ball is hit; (ii) 
the ball is hit to the outfield (fair or foul) or to infield foul territory; (iii) the batter is put out because an 
outfielder (or an infielder running in the outfield or foul territory) catches the ball on the fly (or alternatively if 
the batter would have been out if not for an error or if the outfielder drops the ball and another runner is put 
out); and (iv) a runner who is already on base scores on the play. It is called a ‘sacrifice’ fly because the batter 
presumably intends to cause a teammate to score a run while sacrificing his own ability to do so. A sacrifice fly 
is not counted as a turn at bat for the batter, though the batter is credited with a run batted in. 
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7. Hits by pitches (HBP) records the number of times that a batter or his equipment (other than his bat) is hit in 
some part of his body by a pitch from the pitcher. A hit batsman is awarded first base, provided that (in the plate 
umpire’s judgment) he made an honest effort to avoid the pitch. 
8. Total bases are the number of bases a player has gained through hitting. It is the sum of his hits weighted by 1 
for a single, 2 for a double (if he gets to second base as a result of his hit), 3 for a triple (if he gets to third base) 
and 4 for a home run. Only bases attained from hits count toward this total. After a player collects a hit, whether 
it be a single, double, triple or home run, the total bases stat can be applied. Whether or not this player advances 
further during the inning, by stealing a base or advancing off another players hit, does not increase his/her total 
base number. Thus, 
 
TB =1B+ 2 2B( )+3 3B( )+ 4 HR( )  
9. On-base plus slugging (OPS) is a hitter’s slugging average plus his on-base percentage (OBP). Slugging 
average reflects hitting power and defined as the ratio of total bases to at bats. On-base percentage (OBP) is a 
measure of how often a batter reaches base for any reason other than a fielding error, fielder’s choice, dropped / 
uncaught third strike, fielder’s obstruction, or catcher’s interference (the latter two are ignored as either times-
on-base (TOB) or plate appearances in calculating OBP).  
10. OBP is calculated as: 
 
OBP = H + BB+ HBP( ) AB+ BB+ HBP+ SF( ) . 
11. OBS is calculated as:
 
OBS = AB H + BB+ HBP( )+TB AB+ BB+ HBP+ SF( )éë ùû AB AB+ BB+ HBP+ SF( )éë ùû . 
Pitchers 
12. A pitcher is assigned a win or a loss depending on whether he was the pitcher of record when the decisive run 
was scored. One is the pitcher of record if one is the pitcher at the point when the player who scores the 
decisive run is allowed to reach a base.  
13. Complete games is the number of games where the pitcher was the only pitcher for his team.  
14. A pitcher earns a save if he enters a game led by the pitcher's team, finishes the game without surrendering the 
lead, is not the winning pitcher, and either (a) the lead was three runs or fewer when the pitcher entered the 
game; (b) the potential tying run was on base, at bat, or on deck; or (c) the pitcher pitched three or more innings. 
15. Number of home runs conceded (HR) which is assumed to be negatively related to salary, is the number of 
pitches that were hit by batters which were scored as a home run.  
16. A pitcher is assigned a walk, which is assumed to be negatively related to salary, if he allows a batter to reach 
base after pitching him four balls. He is assigned a strikeout (K) if he pitches three strikes (pitched balls counted 
against the batter, typically swung at and missed or fouled off) in a row.  
17. An inning is one of nine periods in a MLB game in which each team has a turn at bat; innings pitched is the 
number of such periods when the pitcher was working.  
18. Earned run average is negatively correlated with the pitcher’s ability to prevent the opposing team from 
scoring. It equals the number of times the pitcher allows a batter to score a Run (where the batter scores a point 
by advancing around the bases and reaching home plate safely) multiplied by nine, divided by the number of 
Innings Pitched.  
19. Defense-Independent Component ERA (DICE) was created in 2001 as a variation on Component ERA (CERA). 
CERA was created to create a more accurate way of evaluating pitchers than ERA. Whereas ERA is significantly 
affected by luck (such as whether the component hits are allowed consecutively), CERA eliminates this factor 
and assigns a weight to each of the recorded ‘components’ of a pitcher’s performance. For CERA, these are 
singles, doubles, triples, home runs, walks and hit batters. DICE is an improvement on CERA that removes the 
contribution of the pitcher’s defense and instead estimates a pitcher’s ERA from the components of his pitching 
record that do not involve defense. These are home runs, walks, hits by pitch and strikeouts. DICE is thus 
calculated as: 
 
DICE = 3+ 13HR+3 BB+ HBP( )- 2Kéë ùû IP   
 
